Introduction
The past few decades have borne witness to the emergence of two conceptual paradigms that have fundamentally transformed the software industry. The first is the open source movement. Open source is based on the principle that every user should be able to modify software freely. In so doing, open source seeks to mobilize the entire community of end users to volunteer their time to debug the code. The freedom to build freely on existing software also enhances competition by enabling anyone being charged excessive prices to develop their own alternative. The flexibility provided by open source also promises to promote innovation by empowering all users to add new functionality to the system.
The second is the idea of platforms. Platforms are standardized architectures that divide complex systems into modules and define the interfaces that link these modules. Modular platforms represent a break from the traditional approach to managing complexity in which a single actor manages the software development process. In a modular platform, any interested third party can create a component for the overall system so long as the resulting component complies with the standardized interface. In so doing, platforms allow multiple actors to pursue parallel innovation, which can improve the quality of the technical solution as well as increase the rate of technological change. The standardization inherent in modular platforms also allows device manufacturers and app providers to unlock the economic potential of their innovation by allowing them to reach large user bases without having to constantly create new versions for each new hardware device.
These two concepts can be powerfully complementary in certain settings. Indeed, commentators have long recognized that the distributed development model underlying the open source movement necessarily depends on modularity to divide the system into parts small enough to be improved by individual work groups and programmers and to enable multiple actors to work to improve different parts of the system simultaneously. 1 The compatibility and affinity between these two concepts is demonstrated eloquently by the fact that two of the most important operating systems, Unix and Linux, are simultaneously platforms for third-party apps and open source.
What is less well recognized is the extent to which these two concepts rest in uneasy tension with one another. While the freedom of open source suggests unlimited flexibility to change parts of the system, to function properly modular platforms require that all components adhere strictly to a predetermined set of standards that govern how the different components interconnect and interact. This tension is well illustrated by the problem of fragmentation, which has long been recognized as a major problem for many open source projects. The most extreme form of fragmentation, known as forking, occurs when a contributor to an open source project 1 See, e.g., Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 76-79, 170-71) ; Weber (2004, 172-74) .
customizes a non-application layer of a platform to an extent that it is no longer fully interoperable with the rest of the project. The result is to divide the system into two distinct and incompatible versions. See, e.g., Weber (2004, 64, 89, 170) ; Corbett (2011). restrictions to open source mobile operating systems, paying particular attention to Google's Android Anti-Fragmentation Agreement. It also lays out key features that make such restrictions less problematic from the standpoint of competition policy. platforms are subject to some constraints is thus not inherently problematic. The proper role for competition policy is to provide a framework for determining when such constraints are reasonable.
The Conceptual Underpinnings of Open Source and Modular Platforms
Understanding the simultaneous connection and tension between open source and modular platforms requires an appreciation of the principles underlying each concept.
Open Source
Open source software is often put forth as a new paradigm in software production.
Computer programs can be distributed in two forms. 3 The first is known as source code, which is written in a programming language such as Pascal and Fortran, to use two dated examples that have been replaced by newer languages such C++, Python, and Perl. Although source code is quite technical, experienced programmers can read and modify it. Source code is then compiled into object code or machine language, which consists of a series of 0s and 1s. Object code can be read by computers, but cannot easily be read by human beings.
One of the main triggers for the open source movement was software companies' practice of attempting to protect their software by distributing it only as object code and refusing to release the source code. These companies also copyrighted their code and included clauses in end-user licenses prohibiting customers from modifying it. The absence of the source code and the contractual restrictions on modifying the code made it difficult for end users who wished to customize the code to diagnose and resolve incompatibility problems.
Frustration over the inability to customize code led to the open source movement. The foregoing discussion draws on Marella and Yoo (2007 Beyond these formal attributes, open source projects depend on a vibrant community willing to volunteer their time to improve and extend the project. The belief is that opening up the opportunity to improve the code to the entire user base will increase the total number of person-hours devoted to the project and will identify and fix problems more rapidly. This spirit has been captured by Eric Raymond (1999) dubbed Linus's Law: "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow."
Modular Platforms
One of the biggest problems confronting any major software project is how to coordinate the various teams working on different parts of the system. One of the most famous examples 4
See, e.g., DiBona et al. (1999, 8-9) ; Perens (1999, 80); Stallman (1999, 37); McGowan (2001, 260-65) .
arose when IBM was developing the System/360 computer. To make sure that the entire team understood the full intricacies of the design, the project managers required that every programmer maintain a workbook documenting all of the other parts of the system. In just six months, the workbook was five feet long and required filing of 150 pages of updates each day.
Worse yet, even when the project was running behind, managers found that adding more personnel actually slowed the project down. This insight has led to the coining of what is known as Brooks's Law (1975, 31) , which holds that "adding manpower to a late software product makes it later."
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In addition, one of the hallmarks of a complex system is the way that components can interact with one another in unexpected ways. 6 Validating a complex system requires testing every possible combination of states of the world that each of the various components of the system can possibly occupy. If the number of interdependencies is large, the number of unique combinations of parameters that must be tested can rapidly become immense, particularly if each component is permitted to occupy a large number of states. 7 The problem becomes even more difficult if the interdependencies form a circuit that recursively loops back onto itself (e.g., if task A depends on task B, which in turn depends on task C, which depends on task A). When that is the case, testing requires exploring not only every possible combination of states of the world, but also cycling through enough iterations until each combination reaches stability.
The traditional approach to managing the inherent complexity of large software projects is for a single actor to coordinate and control all of the design teams working on a project and to use managerial processes to ensure that the communication and testing needed for proper 5 Brooks (1975, 31) .
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The analysis of modularity draws on Yoo (2016) .
7 Dijkstra (1968, 344) .
integration of the design occurs. The tightness of the control means that most firms either produce components themselves or maintain strict control over any third parties on which they rely to produce components of the overall system.
A new approach has emerged that replaces the strong integrated design with a modular architecture. Modular architectures minimize system complexities by defining the modules so that highly interdependent tasks are clustered within the same module. 8 Cross-module interdependencies are limited by requiring that modules interact with one another solely through predetermined interfaces that strictly cabin the amount of information that can pass between modules, the details of which are often defined in open standards.
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The existence of these standardized interfaces minimizes the need for firms producing components to coordinate with one another. So long as a component manufacturer conforms to the standard, any third party can produce compatible components. All of the information needed to coordinate with other modules is embodied in the standards. This allows third parties to work on different components of the same system without having to worry that any changes made to any one component might create ripple effects throughout the entire system. Moreover, it allows multiple teams working in parallel to experiment with different technical ways to implement a particular module, allowing greater latitude to experiment with different solutions and faster innovation.
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For the classic statement, see Simon (1962 For academic studies of the link between modularity and open source, see, e.g., Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003, 1247); Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 76-79) ; Weber (2004, 172-74) ; Clark and Baldwin (2006) ; Midha and Paliva (2012, 903) .
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The discussion that follows draws heavily on the superb analysis in Weber (2004) . For other important accounts, see DiBona et al. (1999) and Feller and Fitzgerald (2002) . Indeed, the rigid logical structure through which modules are interconnected is what allows multiple third parties to work on the same project. Conway's Law (1968) , which has long been recognized as a central tenet of software production, holds that the architectural structure of technical systems mirrors the organizational structure that produces them. This means that without the distributed nature inherent in a modular architecture, the distributed organizational production system that characterizes open source could not exist.
The Tensions Between Open Source and Modularity
Open source advocates have acknowledged that the freedom to innovate that lies at the heart of open source software represents something of a two-edged sword. Open source inherently gives end users complete latitude to customize software as they see fit. Although such unfettered freedom is unproblematic when the code is run in isolation, it becomes more problematic when the code is supposed to interoperate with the other components of an interoperable platform. As noted earlier, modular platforms depend on standardized interfaces that predefine how different modules will interact with one another. Although one can experiment with different configurations of tasks within a module, interactions between modules must strictly adhere with the interfaces. Any code that does not conform to the modular design becomes noninteroperable with the rest of the system.
The tension between flexibility and structure can lead to two characteristic problems with open source platforms. The first is the temptation for people modifying individual components to introduce interdependencies that deviate from the modular architecture. The second is the possibility that a subgroup of an open source project may fragment the project, in extreme cases dividing into two distinct and incompatible branches in a phenomenon called forking.
The Temptation to Create Noncompliant Modules and the Need for Testing
As noted earlier, the key design feature of a modular architecture is the clustering of highly interdependent tasks within the same module and ensuring that the interdependencies that are supposed to be encapsulated within that module do not affect other modules. The key to ensuring that these interdependencies remain isolated within a module is to design the module interfaces so that they contain only information associated with interdependencies that are permitted by the design and to require that other modules restrict themselves to interact only with the information made visible by the interface. All information about other independencies remains hidden within the module.
The tradeoff inherent in this approach means that "designers will lose the ability to explore some parts of the space of designs-in effect, the architects will restrict the search, declaring some parts of the design space to be out of bounds." 12 More specifically, the generality inherent in modularity inevitably leads to a degree of inefficiency. 13 There will inevitably be occasions where one module finds that the most efficient way to solve the problem at hand would be to refer to information contained in an adjacent module, despite the fact that that information is excluded from the module interface and is thus associated with an interdependency that is supposed to remain encapsulated within the module. Moreover, generality requires incurring the cost to support features that particular implementations may never need.
12 Baldwin and Clark (2000, 68) .
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The inefficiency and inflexibility inherent in this result led early scholars to denounce the use of modular interfaces as "radical." 14 Over time, these critics began to concede that using information hiding to implement modularity created real benefits. 15 This concession does not eliminate the reality that inefficiency remains an irreducible part of any modular platform and that open source module developers have both the ability and the incentive to access information associated with interdependencies that they are not supposed to take into account. This dynamic explains why the number of interdependencies among Linux modules has increased exponentially with each release.
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A recent dispute between Skyhook Wireless and Google provides an apt illustration of these dynamics. 17 Both Skyhook and Google provide location services, which are apps that identify the latitude and longitude coordinates for the location of the device. Location services determine geolocation data from one of three sources: (1) global positioning satellites (GPS), (2) WiFi access points whose locations have been stored in a manually compiled database, and (3) triangulation on cell tower locations. Of these three, GPS is considered the most accurate, but is typically slower than the other methods. 18 All location services incorporate the data they collect into the existing databases. Because GPS data is considered more accurate, the Android GPS application programming interface (API) reports data collected from GPS, WiFi, and cell towers separately to give developers that rely on this data a clear understanding of its quality.
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16 Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 176 Modularity theory provides a clear basis for understanding why the court's decision was correct. To function properly, every module must be able to trust that all of the information being sent by other modules comprising the system complies with the design architecture. To ensure that is the case, some means must exist for identifying and excluding noncompliant modules. Compliance and testing mechanisms ensure that each module can rely on the fact that all of the other modules are operating in the manner specified by the design.
When a mobile platform is proprietary, the subgroups designing individual modules rely on the command and control apparatus of the company to ensure that this is the case. In contrast, Id. at 418.
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Id. at 420-22, 423-24. 24 Id. at 418, 424, 427. modules. Instead, the activities of the different modules are coordinated by the information structure of the architecture rather than a firm. Modules must restrict themselves to sending only the information that the other modules expect if the architecture is to function properly. All actors participating in an open platform depend on the presence of some governance mechanism for ensuring that all of the components created by the various third-party providers comply with the architecture. Thus exclusion of a noncompliant app from the system should not automatically be regarded as a sign of anticompetitive or improper behavior. On the contrary, it may be a necessary part of any open architecture.
Fragmentation
The The more open the system, the more it can be modified by vendors and users to their own ends, which is good. The more a system is modified, however, the more likely that the modifications will be nonstandard. With many nonstandard versions of UNIX available, software vendors need to disperse (perhaps dissipate) their software efforts among many systems, leading to fewer pieces of software available to any one system. . . . This result reduces choice, which is bad. Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 96) .
Mechanisms for Resolving These Tensions: Testing and Governance
is determined by peer review and who works the hardest, and the community adopts the pragmatic and meritocratic position of "letting the code decide."
In practice, open source projects operate in a much more concentrated and hierarchical manner. In fact, studies have indicated that 85% to 90% of contributed code is discarded.
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Another study indicated that ten developers (less than 0.1% of the overall universe of developers) contribute almost 20% of the code base for each project. Ghosh and Prakash (2000) .
28 Lerner and Tirole (2002, 221 Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 91 Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 159-60 To say that open source projects require a type of leadership that is somewhat different from the leadership that characterizes commercial companies that produce proprietary software is not to say that they need no leadership at all. On the contrary, ensuring that an open source platform does not fragment depends on the presence of an actor with sufficient authority to resolve disputes and to steer the platform in a beneficial direction.
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Lessons from the Past: Unix, Linux, and Symbian
The concepts of open source software and modular platforms represent something of a paradox. They are inextricably bound together, while at the same time resting in uneasy tension with one another. Although open source holds out the promise of unbridled freedom, to the extent that the software needs to interoperate with other components on a standardized basis, it is not completely free.
Fortunately, two classic solutions exist to this problem. First, the fact that some components will be provided by third-parties requires the existence of some means to test components for compliance with the architecture. Second, the possibility of forking requires some form of governance to help prevent the platform from fragmenting.
A review of the histories of three well-known open source operating systems-Unix, Symbian, and Linux-provides an eloquent illustration of these dynamics. The case study of Linux serves as an example of how these dynamics can benefit end users. Although Unix and
Symbian have enjoyed some degree of success, their ultimate fate consigns them more to the role of cautionary tales. The collapse of Unix represents a classic example of fragmentation. The existence of multiple versions of Unix forced the software community dedicated to debugging and improving the operating system to disperse its energy across multiple, duplicative efforts. Unix was also dogged by the lack of a standardized and friendly user interface. The lack of a unified platform prevented app developers from leveraging compatibility and forced them to spend the resources needed to create specialized versions for each environment. 39 The Unix universe also lacked a strong leader with the authority to resolve disputes and put the platform back on the right track.
Unix
The lack of any mechanism or authority for offering some guidance over Unix's evolution prevented the community from creating a solution even after these problems had been recognized.
Unfortunately, these problems emerged at a critical time in the computer industry. The creation of Windows NT in 1993, which was the first version of Windows that was completely free from MS-DOS, led to its widespread adoption in the PC world. IBM, Hewlett Packard, Sun
Microsystems, Santa Cruz Operation, Univel, and UNIX System Laboratories made a last-ditch effort to unify the platform, but failed. Novell tried to forestall the inevitable by making Unix 38 Korzeniowski (1985) . 39 Weber (2004, 98) completely open, but to no avail. At the same time, the developer community left for Linux. 
Symbian
The second cautionary tale is Symbian. Symbian's history offers a number of warning signs for future efforts. First, although support for a wide variety of form factors and screen sizes greatly enhances competition and consumer choice, it also presents significant challenges in terms of fragmentation. Second, left to their own devices, the various Symbian device manufacturers each attempted to use aspects of the operating system and user interface as key differentiators instead of investing in compatibility and the viability of the platform as a whole. The emergence of multiple user interfaces, each with its own mutually incompatible APIs, required app providers to undertake the effort to port each app for each manufacturers' device, which fragmented the Symbian ecosystem still further.
Linux
In 1991 Commentators have been struck by the limited extent to which Linux has fragmented.
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The primary reason is that, in stark contrast to Unix, Linux had a natural leader: Linus Torvalds.
As Linux's founder, Torvalds was the natural person to exercise authority over the system. He bolstered his authority by adopting a self-deprecating manner, going to great lengths to document and justify his decisions, and being willing to admit when he is wrong.
When necessary, Torvalds has not been afraid to take action. A second threat arose in 1998, when the operator of a mirror site complained that Torvalds was taking too long to accept patches to the code. Torvalds obviated the threat by agreeing to a pyramid structure, which deputized key lieutenants to take the lead in reviewing submissions, while retaining Torvalds as the final authority to resolving disputes. A similar dispute in 2002 led to the creation of additional layer of organizational decisionmaking.
Torvalds's status as Linux's creator, the goodwill he earned for his dedication and good judgment in managing the community, and the deft touch he exercised in handling the interpersonal dynamics gave him the authority to prevent major forks from emerging.
See, e.g., DiBona et al. (1999, 12) ; Weber (2004, 158-59) .
Thus, although Linux has achieved some success, it does not represent the world of total freedom, bottom-up spontaneous ordering, and technical meritocracy that the collectivist rhetoric surrounding open source might lead people to believe. The history of Linux reveals that prevention of the fragmentation that can have such a devastating negative impact on open source projects was the result of an elaborate system of governance. The result is a process that is quite formal and hierarchical, notwithstanding the fact that participation in any open source project is completely voluntary.
Implications for Modern Smartphone Operating Systems
Taken together, the histories of Unix, Linux, and Symbian provide a number of insights into the dynamics surrounding open source operating systems. As an initial matter, the desire to support multiple physical devices increases porting costs and causes a significant risk of fragmentation. In addition, the participation of multiple device manufacturers, each pursuing its own interests, creates additional pressures towards fragmentation. The case studies also illustrate the point made above that the best way to prevent fragmentation is through strong governance.
Linux was able to resist these pressures because of the leadership of Linus Torvalds. For Unix and Symbian, the absence of clear leadership led to a more difficult environment for both end users and app developers in terms of systems integration and maintaining a consistent end user experience. governance should be considered a reasonable step to ensure that the mobile operating system achieves its potential.
The Role of Hardware Diversity
The Symbian experience teaches us that hardware diversity is an important source of fragmentation. Although a broad selection of phones creates real benefits to end users and can enhance competition, hardware variations create significant differences in operating context in terms of screen parameters (size, color depth, orientation, aspect ratio), memory size, processing power, input devices (keyboard, touch screen, etc.), cameras, and connectivity options (WiFi, Bluetooth, Infrared, Global Packet Radio Service), just to name a few. 
The Need for Testing and Governance
Apart from the differences in hardware platforms, third-party provisioning and the divergence of incentives requires that end users must have some means for verifying that components comply with the design. As noted above, some means for testing devices is necessary to have functioning markets for third-party provision and for end users to know that and the incentives to make noncompliant devices may become sufficiently strong that device manufacturers cannot be expected to abide by the honor system. This danger makes some system for verification essential. Requiring end users to conduct such tests would be burdensome and unnecessarily duplicative. The result is that some degree of provider-based testing appears inevitable.
Within provider-based testing, a range of alternative approaches to testing and governance exist, each one varying in terms of restrictiveness. (1) The most restrictive approach is for the platform sponsor to manufacture all of its own smartphones. While this approach gives the platform complete authority to ensure compatibility, this approach imposes limits on the variety of hardware devices and on competitive entry. (2) A less restrictive approach would permit third parties to produce devices, but require that manufacturers to submit their devices to the platform sponsor for certification and testing. While more permissive than the first option, this approach risks giving the platform sponsor gatekeeper control over all devices. (3) An even less restrictive approach would provide a compatibility standard along with open testing tools for device manufacturers to self-certify that their devices comply with that standard. This approach provides device manufacturers the most flexibility and offers the greatest benefits in terms of variety of devices and ease of competitive entry. (4) In addition, a platform sponsor may adopt a hybrid approach that gives module creators a choice between (2) and (3).
In addition to testing regimes to ensure compatibility, open source projects must rely on some form of governance to prevent fragmentation and forking. A nonexclusive requirement to maintain compatibility would seem to be the least restrictive approach.
The Android platform that is the current subject of antitrust scrutiny generally falls within the last and least restrictive of these options. The following, more detailed review of Android's licensing practices reveals that within this regime, device manufacturers can choose among a range of possible licensing alternatives.
The Android Open Source Project (AOSP) License Agreement
The least restrictive option is to license the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) source code without making any commitments as to the modification or implementation of the code.
The software is royalty free under an Apache open source license, although some hardware is subject to patent licenses. The Apache licenses ensure that device manufacturers remain free to modify the source code as they see fit. They also remain free to produce other devices using other operating systems if they so choose.
The most prominent provider to go this route is Amazon, which has created its own operating system known as Fire OS, which is based on AOSP and runs the Amazon's Kindle and The Android license agreement for AOSP places device manufacturers under no obligations to carry any Android apps and leaves them free to add whatever apps they choose.
Because there are no restrictions on the level of customization, the resulting devices may not be compatible with apps written for other Android devices.
The Compatibility Definition Document (CDD) and the Compatibility Test Suite (CTS)
The second level of compatibility is for a device manufacturer to guarantee interoperability by ensuring that its device satisfies a published compatibility standard. The compatibility standard for each version of Android is embodied in a Compatibility Definition Document (CDD). Google also provides a free Compatibility Test Suite (CTS) that device manufacturers may use to determine whether their device is compatible. The goals of the CDD are to:
 Provide a consistent application and hardware environment to application developers  Enable a consistent application experience for end users  Enable device manufacturers to differentiate while being compatible.  Minimize costs and overhead costs of compatibility.
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Devices that comply with the CDD must include nine core applications: Desk Clock, Browser, Calendar, Contacts, Gallery, GlobalSearch, Launcher, Music, and Settings. These applications tend to provide basic functions on which other applications draw, so their presence provides a consistent set of resources on which the app developer community can draw. Device manufacturers can satisfy this requirement either by using the versions of these apps provided by
Google or by providing their own apps so long as they satisfy the interoperability requirements.
The CDD also requires that the device include a complete set of Android APIs and Android developer tools to ensure that the device will operate properly. Device manufacturers remain free to develop and distribute their own APIs in addition to those required by the CDD.
The goal is to create a baseline of interoperability that helps app developers by creating a stable set of resources and by eliminating the porting costs/multiple versions for different builds, while at the same time preserving a degree of flexibility. Devices that demonstrate compliance with the CDD by passing the CTS are regarded as Android compliant. Importantly, device manufacturers may choose to comply with the CDD without signing any agreements.
44 Android (n.d.) .
It bears noting that mandatory apps do not include any Google proprietary apps or apps alleged to be give rise to market power by competition regulators. CDD compliant devices are under no obligation to install any of these services and remain free to include apps that compete directly with these services. Device manufacturers may also use whatever search service they would like.
The Anti-Fragmentation Agreement
Device manufacturers who would like greater certification of compatibility can sign the Anti-Fragmentation Agreement (AFA), which was first created in early 2008, when Android was nascent and one year prior to the launch of the first Android smartphone. The AFA requires signatories to promise (1) that all Android devices it makes will fulfill the CDD requirements and (2) not to take any actions that may cause the fragmentation of Android.
As noted above, the first provision, requiring that all Android devices made by the signatory fulfill the CDD requirements, only requires the installation of basic services, such as Desk Clock, Browser, Calendar, Contacts, and Settings. It does not prevent device manufacturers from substituting their own versions of the required apps so long as they pass the compatibility test. The CDD also does not place any restrictions on the device manufacturer's ability to market non-Android devices (i.e., devices based on other operating systems, such as Windows Phone, Blackberry, or Linux).
The second provision, prohibiting device manufacturers from taking any actions that would fragment Android, is effectively a reiteration of the first provision in that it prohibits manufacturers from creating Android phones that do not comply with the CDD. The rationale is that permitting device manufacturers to sell both CDD-compliant and CDD-noncompliant Android phones can increase app developers' costs by requiring them to port their apps to multiple platforms and can create potential confusion among consumers over which phones are Android compliant and which ones are not.
Signatories that satisfy these requirements are eligible to declare their devices to be 
Safety Valves
The terms of the AFA contain a number of features that make it much less likely that its terms can properly be regarded as problematic. As an initial matter, the basic licensing agreement for AOSP, the apps that the CDD requires to be installed, the CTS tool for evaluating compliance, and the AFA are all royalty free.
In addition, the AFA is nonmandatory: many device manufacturers (especially in China) opt to comply with the CDD without signing the AFA. Moreover, both the CDD and the AFA are nonexclusive in that device manufacturers can market any non-Android devices (see, e.g., Samsung and ZTE) and can substitute their own apps or otherwise customize the hardware and software so long as they comply with the CDD (see, e.g., Xiaomi, Huawei, ZTE, and HTC).
Finally, the presence of meaningful market options makes it unlikely that either the CDD or the AFA will harm competition. Because Android's is based on open source, any device manufacturer that is unwilling to comply with the CDD or sign the AFA remains free to produce its own version of Android. Specifically, adopting too restrictive a stance on the use of agreements like the AFA to limit fragmentation may force mobile operating systems seeking to avoid fragmentation either to adopt Apple-style vertical integration or to require that all device manufacturers submit their phones for testing. This would effectively bar mobile operating system providers from employing the least restrictive of these three alternatives. If so, this would reduce the diversity and competitiveness of mobile operating systems and would substantially increase the barriers to entry for OEMs, developers, and other platform participants.
In short, all of the approaches have advantages and disadvantages that appeal to different types of consumers. In addition, providers face a considerable amount of uncertainty over the best way to strike the proper balance the benefits to innovation associated with flexibility and concerns about fragmentation. This underscores the error in regarding the selection of the ideal governance regime as an either-or choice. On the contrary, end users benefit the most by being able to choose among different options that are exploring different approaches to preventing fragmentation. . 45 MADAs typically require device manufacturers to preload all of the apps contained in GMS, including Play, YouTube, Maps, and Gmail. MADA also require that the Google Search widget and the Play icon be accessible with at most one phone tap away from the home screen and that Google Search be the default for in-app searches, although 45 Although the terms of specific MADA are confidential, two MADA were made public as part of the record in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012 Weber (2004, .
47 Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 175-76) .
48 Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 132, 175) ; Weber (2004, 237-38) .
49 Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 22) . friendly interface easily implementable by a nontechnical person. 50 Symbian suffered from similar problems. As noted earlier, different groups of manufacturers each made their own proprietary enhancements to Symbian, which in turn created three distinct Symbian software platforms (S60, UIQ, and MOAP), each with its own user interface. The result was an end-user interface that was quite inconsistent and did not provide app developers with a consistent platform for which to design their products. 51 Linux users must choose from dozens of end-user interfaces, although Linux is attempting to standardize around the K Desktop Environment (KDE) and GNU Network Object Model Environment ("GNOME"). 52 These challenges have prevented Linux from achieving significant penetration into the home desktop and laptop market.
While the diversity of form factors, screen sizes, and user interfaces among Android devices yields many benefits, the end-user experience also varies widely from device to device.
Android users must adapt to every new device. In contrast, the consistency of the end-user interface is often regarded as one of the primary advantages of the Apple iPhone.
The fragmentation of end-user interfaces poses difficulties for the developer community.
The variations in code and format often force them to create versions for each environment in which they would like to operate, increasing their costs and making it more difficult for them to enter new markets.
The ideal solution would be to introduce some element that permits greater consistency to the end-user experience without losing the benefits of product diversity and entry by new firms associated with an open source environment. The MADA represents one attempt to strike a balance between these two competing considerations. Requiring signatories to use specific 50 Korzeniowski (1985) ; McKusick (1999, 56) .
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52 Feller and Fitzgerald (2002, 22) ; Weber (2004, 102-03, 238 ).
Google-provided apps helps unify the end-user experience. The goal is to provide end users with a consistent baseline of out-of-the-box functionality. At the same time, the GMS apps provide a more consistent platform for the app community.
The need to remedy the lack of a consistent end-user experience that has long plagued the open source operating system provides a strong justification for the type of restrictions contained in the MADA. The fact that the apps required by the MADA are royalty free and nonexclusive reduces the likelihood of any anticompetitive effects. Most importantly, preventing open source projects from using agreements like the MADA to address this key weakness would leave them incentives to assert more direct control over end-user interfaces by adopting policies that place more restrictions on device manufacturers and app providers. Thus, overly vigorous antitrust oversight imposed in the name of promoting competition and protecting consumers runs the risk of actually reducing competition and consumer choice.
Conclusion
Open source operating systems thus something of a conundrum. On the one hand, open source requires that developers have absolute freedom to modify the software as they see fit. On the other hand, the software must obey certain architectural rules if it is to serve as a platform that can bring together different types of hardware and applications. The flexibility inherent in open source can lead to incompatibility. In extreme cases, it can even cause the open source project to fork into two or more different branches.
Such fragmentation dissipates the economic benefits of being able to access a large customer base through a single platform and forces app developers to expend the cost to make their products compatible with multiple versions of the operating system. One classic solution to these problems is to rely on some form of testing to ensure that the components provided by third parties are configured to comply with a compatibility standard. Another is to subject the overall system to some form of governance. Although both alternatives may seem to be somewhat inconsistent with the philosophy of open source, the academic literature indicates that both are a necessary aspect of any modular platform in which multiple parties provide separate components. The question is thus not whether such restrictions must exist, but rather how restrictive they have to be.
The history of the three leading open source operating systems (Unix, Symbian, and Linux) confirms this insight. Moreover, an approach that permits third parties to self-certify represents the least restrictive way to implement such requirements. Any restrictions are also less likely to be problematic if they are royalty-free, nonexclusive, and open source. It thus appears that solutions such as Google's Anti-Fragmentation Agreement represent one way to strike a reasonable balance between ensuring that the operating system serves as a platform that brings together mobile devices and applications in a way that promotes the ability to "write once, run anywhere" and giving device manufacturers and app developers as much flexibility as possible. Given the lingering uncertainty about the best way to balance these concerns, end users and technological progress would best be served by giving operating system providers considerable latitude in determining the best way to promote freedom without creating undue risks of fragmentation.
